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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a man with severe mental disabilities. This man is in the 
custody of immigration officials seeking to deport him from the United 
States. He has not worked for a number of years due to his disability and 
cannot afford an attorney. The man was given a list of legal clinics that 
could represent him for free, but they have too many clients and cannot 
take his case. His family (if he has any) is unable to cope with his 
disabilities and refuses to assist him. In any case, they cannot pay for an 
attorney either. So when the man goes before the immigration judge to 
plead his case, he goes alone. Our detainee cannot, of course, represent 
his own interests with any efficacy. He has no knowledge of immigration 
law, and his disability prevents him from fully understanding the nature 
of his circumstances. Unless the court assists him in pursuing his rights, 
our detainee will have no access to the full and fair proceeding to which 
he is entitled. The judge assigned to our detainee’s case is extremely 
overburdened.  
 In fact, he sees hundreds of detainees per week.
1
 So, when our 
detainee exhibits unusual behavior, the judge does not recognize the 
signs for what they are and makes no accommodations for him. As a 
result, our detainee is unlawfully deported from the United States. Some 
time later, our detainee—now a deportee—reaches out to the United 
States government to reopen his case. Perhaps he has finally managed to 
acquire an attorney. But it has now been months (perhaps years) since 
the judge issued his final order. There is no legal mechanism to get his 
                                                                                                             
1 An average immigration judge sees over 1500 respondents over the course of the 
year. Daniel Costa, Overloaded Immigration Courts, ECON.POLICY INST. (July 24, 2014), 
http://www.epi.org/publication/immigration-court-caseload-skyrocketing/. 
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case reheard so far past the time of the decision. As a result, his unlawful 
deportation will stand. 
As the hypothetical above illustrates, immigration courts do not 
automatically provide attorneys to immigration respondents.
2
 
Consequently, only 43% of immigration respondents had legal 
representation in 2010.
3
 It is also estimated that 15% of immigration 
detainees suffer from a mental disability,
4
 and Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (―ICE‖) performed almost 58,000 mental health 
interventions in 2011.
5
 While precise information is unavailable on how 
many unrepresented respondents suffer from a mental illness, it is not 
difficult to conclude from these numbers that a judge sees several 
respondents every week who are both unrepresented and have a severe 
mental illness or disability. 
A respondent with a mental disorder, without counsel, is at a 
particular disadvantage in the immigration system,
6
 especially given the 
presumption of competency in the immigration courts.
7
 His condition 
may prevent him from properly communicating with the judge, which 
could then prevent the judge from making accurate findings of fact. In 
addition, a respondent’s mental illness may prevent him from meeting 
any burdens of proof that lie with him.
8
 The result is that many 
individuals with mental illness are likely deported pursuant to incorrect 
rulings. 
In an ideal world, incorrect rulings will be reheard and overturned. 
However, a mentally disabled respondent likely cannot comply with case 
review deadlines the same way a fully competent adult can. It may be 
months or years before he has the capability, either personally or through 
counsel, to ask for further review of his case. At that point, most 
deadlines for getting the Board of Immigration Appeals (―BIA‖) to take a 
                                                                                                             
2 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(b)(4)(A), 1362 (2012) (recognizing the right to legal 
representation of both noncitizens and individuals claiming US citizenship, but indicating 
that counsel must be obtained at no government expense). 
3 US DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Exec. Office for Immigration Review, FY 2010 Statistical 
Year Book G1 (2011). 
4 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & THE ACLU, DEPORTATION BY DEFAULT: MENTAL 
DISABILITY, UNFAIR HEARINGS, AND INDEFINITE DETENTION IN THE U.S. IMMIGRATION 
SYSTEM 3 (July 2010), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/usdeportation0710_0.pdf. 
5 Detainee Health Care FY 2011, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 
(May 22, 2014), http://www.ice.gov/factsheets/dhc-fy11. 
6 Even at the best of times, there is no guarantee that the judge will correctly apply the 
law to the facts at hand, illustrating the need for review mechanisms in the first place. 
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 394 (1946). 
7 See Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 477 (BIA 2011). 
8 See generally IMMIGRATION LEGAL RE R., INADMISSIBILITY AND DEPORTABILITY 
§ 1.5 (3d. ed. 2013), available at http://www.ilrc.org/files/inadmiss_deport-2013-chapte
r_01.pdf (a useful summary of burdens of proof in immigration law). 
230 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:227 
 
second look at the judge’s decision have passed. Thus, immigration law 
is currently in need of a framework for getting the cases of mentally 
disabled respondents reheard past the deadline—in legal terms, a 
framework of equitable tolling. 
Equitable tolling is the doctrine that a statute of limitations will not 
bar a claim if the plaintiff, despite diligent efforts, does not take action 
until after the deadline has passed.
9
 The effect is to suspend or toll the 
deadline until the impediment to filing is removed.
10
 Like other equity 
doctrines, the purpose of equitable tolling is to ensure judicial fairness; it 
recognizes that the mechanical deadlines peppering our legal authorities 
must occasionally bend in the interest of justice.
11
 Mental illness is just 
such a circumstance where mechanical rules are neither useful nor just, 
and this article therefore advocates for a clear and accessible standard of 
equitable tolling in the immigration courts to protect respondents with a 
mental disorder. 
It should be noted that while this article analyzes policies and 
practices in immigration law, its principle extends beyond that field. Any 
court proceeding in which a respondent may appear without counsel 
contains a heightened risk that an individual with a mental illness will 
not receive due relief from the court. Thus, without flexible mechanisms 
for rehearing proceedings, the mentally disabled may have no 
opportunity to receive the just and accurate outcome they are entitled to. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
As general background, the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(―INA‖)12 is the primary authority on immigration law in the United 
States. Alleged violations of the INA are litigated in civil administrative 
courts housed within the Executive Office of Immigration Review 
(―EOIR‖), a component of the Department of Justice (―DOJ‖).13 A 
respondent accused of violating the INA will first go before an EOIR 
immigration judge, who generally can determine removability and 
adjudicate applications for relief from removal.
14
 In these proceedings, 
an attorney from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (―ICE‖), a 
                                                                                                             
9 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 656 (10th ed. 2014). 
10 Id. 
11 See Holmberg, U.S. 392 at 396 (―Equity eschews mechanical rules; it depends on 
flexibility . . . .A suit in equity may lie though a comparable cause of action at law would 
be barred‖). 
12 Codified under 8 U.S.C. 12 (commonly cited to the corresponding INA section). 
13 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 1, 1-2 available at http://
www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/OCIJPracManual/Practice_Manual_review.pdf#page=5 
14 Id. at 4. 
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component of the Department of Homeland Security (―DHS‖) acts as the 
federal government’s representative.15 
After the immigration judge issues a ruling, the respondent then has 
the opportunity to appeal to the BIA, which issues precedential 
decisions.
16
 After the BIA, a respondent may also seek judicial review 
from the courts.
17
 As a result of these proceedings, a respondent may be 
removed against his will from the United States.
18
 
A.  Current Protections for Incompetent Respondents in the 
Immigration Courts: Why Many Immigration Cases Likely 
Need to be Reheard. 
The INA and accompanying regulations contain limited provisions to 
protect the rights of respondents who suffer from incompetency;
19
 for 
example, the judge may not accept an admission of removability from an 
incompetent respondent who appears alone.
20
 To determine who is in fact 
incompetent, the BIA laid out a test in Matter of M-A-M-.
21
 According to 
M-A-M-, a noncitizen is competent if he has a rational and factual 
understanding of the nature and object of the proceedings, can consult 
with an attorney or representative if there is one, and has a reasonable 
opportunity to examine and present evidence and cross-examine 
witnesses.
22
 
The M-A-M- standard of incompetency is very similar to the general 
Dusky v. United States standard of incompetency laid down by the 
Supreme Court in the criminal context; that standard says that a 
                                                                                                             
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 9. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Incompetency, generally, is the ―lack of legal ability in some respect, esp. to stand 
trial or to testify.‖ BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 883 (10th ed. 2014). 
20 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c) (2010). 
21 Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 479 (BIA 2011). 
22 Id. In addition, the EOIR has released the first phase of a plan to implement M-A-M- 
in the immigration courts and to protect the rights of respondents who suffer from mental 
illness; in this plan, the EOIR elaborates on the M-A-M- definition of incompetency. 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, PHASE I OF PLAN TO PROVIDE ENHANCED PROCEDURAL 
PROTECTIONS TO UNREPRESENTED DETAINED RESPONDENTS WITH MENTAL DISORDER 2 
(2013)(hereinafter PHASE 1) (stating that a competent respondent must have a rational and 
factual understanding of: (a) the nature and object of the proceeding, (b) the privilege of 
representation, including but not limited to, the ability to consult with a representative if 
one is present; (c) the right to present, examine, and object to evidence; (d) the right to 
cross-examine witnesses; and (e) the right to appeal. Furthermore, a respondent must also 
have a reasonable ability to (a) make decisions about asserting and waiving rights; (b) 
respond to the allegations and charges in the proceeding; and (c) present information and 
respond to questions relevant to eligibility for relief). 
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competency must have a sufficient present ability to consult with his 
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and a rational 
as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.
23
 The 
notable difference between the two standards is that unlike Dusky, M-A-
M- requires a competent respondent to have a ―reasonable opportunity to 
examine and present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.‖24 This, in 
effect, makes the M-A-M- standard harder to meet, perhaps because the 
immigration courts, unlike the criminal courts, do not provide state-
funded counsel to indigent respondents.
25
 
Recognizing that a respondent with limited competency will have 
difficulty receiving any protections without assistance, the United States 
government has taken the progressive step of providing immigration 
attorneys to respondents who meet this definition of incompetency.
26
 
Furthermore, in addition to laying down the test, M-A-M- also sets out a 
framework for recognizing, evaluating, and safeguarding 
incompetency.
27
 But while the higher standard of incompetency in 
immigration law is, in and of itself, positive for immigration respondents 
who suffer from incompetency, there is no guarantee that a judge will 
even recognize the respondent’s competency in the first place—and 
under the M-A-M- framework, an immigration respondent is not entitled 
to any special protections, including a state-funded attorney, until the 
court recognizes his incompetency.
28
 
1. Matter of M-A-M- laid out a framework for detecting 
and accommodating incompetency 
There are a number of barriers within the M-A-M- framework before 
a respondent can be given counsel. The first challenge is detecting 
incompetency.
29
 Because there is a presumption of competency in the 
immigration courts,
30
 the judge must have reason to suspect that the 
respondent is in fact incompetent—in legal terms, indicia of 
                                                                                                             
23 Dusky v. U.S., 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). 
24 Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 479. 
25 Compare 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(b)(4)(A), 1362 (2012) (recognizing the right to legal 
representation of both noncitizens and individuals claiming US citizenship, but indicating 
that counsel must be obtained at no government expense) with Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335, 338 (1963). 
26 Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security Announce 
Safeguards for Unrepresented Immigration Detainees with Serious Mental Disorders or 
Conditions, THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press
/2013/SafeguardsUnrepresentedImmigrationDetainees.html. 
27 Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 474-75. 
28 Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 477; see also PHASE I, supra note 22, at 2-3. 
29 Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 477. 
30 Id. at 477. 
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incompetency must be present—before the judge can perform a 
competency evaluation or engage any safeguards.
31
 
M-A-M- cites several indicators of incompetency to which the judge 
should be aware.
32
 Some indicators are obvious, such as medical and 
disability records, or direct statements from witnesses that the respondent 
suffers from a mental illness.
33
 Other indicators, however, are more 
elusory—for example, a respondent may manifest his incompetency only 
by his confusion, or by his inability to stay on topic or answer 
questions.
34
 
ICE has an affirmative obligation to turn over materials that may 
inform the court about the respondent’s competency, particularly where 
the respondent is detained.
35
 Ideally, ICE will comply with this 
obligation and inform the court of any mental health issues discovered 
during its investigative or detention process. Nevertheless, it is inherently 
dangerous to depend on an adversarial party to take action that may favor 
the opposition, especially when the opposition is significantly 
disadvantaged.
36
 The judge must be aware of this danger and should be 
ready to ask questions of both parties when determining the presence of 
indicia. 
Once indicia are present, the second challenge is evaluating the 
respondent’s competency level.37 M-A-M- lists several mechanisms a 
judge may use to engage in that evaluation.
38
 Perhaps the most important 
tool at the judge’s disposal is ordering a psychiatric evaluation, which 
will likely provide the most complete information on the respondent’s 
current mental health status.
39
 Indicia of incompetency also triggers 
Matter of E-S-I-, which requires the government to serve additional 
persons besides the respondent, including family or friends, who may 
have knowledge about the respondent’s condition.40 
                                                                                                             
31 Id. 
32 Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 479-80. 
33 See id. 
34 See id. at 479; see also PHASE I, supra note 22, at 4. 
35 Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 480. 
36 See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a 
Post-Modern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5 (1996). 
37 Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 480. 
38 Id. at 480-81. 
39 Id. at 481; see also Kathleen Powers Stafford & Martin O. Sellbom, Assessment of 
Competence to Stand Trial, 11 FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY, HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY 412, 
427 (Irving B. Weiner ed., 2d ed. 2012) (describing the benefits of psychological 
evaluations to the competency evaluation process generally). 
40 Matter of E-S-I-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 136, 145 (BIA 2013) (holding that where indicia of 
incompetency are present, service must be made upon (1) the respondent, (2) a person 
with whom the respondent resides, and (3) a relative, guardian, or friend). 
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After the evaluation procedures are completed, the judge determines 
whether the respondent is competent under the foregoing test.
41
 If 
incompetency is found, the third challenge is to implement appropriate 
safeguards.
42
 The EOIR instructs judges to provide unrepresented, 
incompetent respondents with a ―qualified legal representative,‖43 
although there are many other tools at the judge’s disposal to ensure a 
respondent is given a full and fair hearing.
44
 
2. Matter of M-A-M- is likely insufficient to protect 
incompetent immigration respondents 
As indicated above, some indicia of incompetency are not obvious, 
and indicia may not be present at all. The judge, therefore, faces 
significant obstacles in identifying signs of mental illness. He may 
misinterpret indicia of incompetency as signs of poverty or lack of 
education. The judge may also conclude that the respondent is 
deliberately interfering with the judicial process. Even in M-A-M-, the 
respondent told the judge that he had schizophrenia (emphasis added).
45
 
Absent such obvious indicia presented to the court that case may never 
have gone forward. When the court either does not have or does not 
recognize indicia, DHS is left as the court’s only source of information 
about the respondent’s competency. And again, it is problematic to rely 
on DHS to take action that would favor their opposition. 
Given the difficulties in its application, courts have rarely applied 
Matter of M-A-M- in a written decision. The limited case law on the 
subject likely exacerbates the problem. Judges (and counsel) are left with 
little or no legal guidance on how to implement M-A-M- in the day-to-
day cases they work with. Thus, the problem becomes cyclical. A judge 
has limited ability to recognize indicia of incompetency, and implements 
no safeguards. The judge then renders an inappropriate ruling, which is 
almost never challenged. Even more dangerously, the lack of information 
may lead the judge to the erroneous conclusion that the problems 
surrounding mental illness are minor or nonexistent, so that the judge is 
not on guard. The result is that there are likely numerous cases of 
                                                                                                             
41 Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 481. 
42 Id. at 481. 
43 PHASE I, supra note 22, at 3 
44 See Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 483; see also PHASE I, supra note 22, at 15 
(examples of other such safeguards may include, but are not limited to, managing the 
case to facilitate the respondent’s ability to obtain legal representation and/or medical 
treatment in an effort to restore competency; participation of a guardian; waiving the 
respondent’s appearance; actively aiding in the development of the record, including the 
questioning of witnesses; and reserving appeal rights for the respondent). 
45 Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 475. 
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respondents with a mental disorder who have been deported despite 
qualifying for legal relief from removal. Thus, these respondents need a 
legal mechanism to get their cases reheard. 
B. How to Call a Do-Over: An Overview of Case Review 
Mechanisms in Immigration Law 
There are several mechanisms to rehear an immigration case in 
which the judge has already ruled. The first and most obvious is an 
appeal to the BIA.
46
 The filing deadline for an appeal is thirty days after 
the judge renders his decision.
47
 This deadline is strictly enforced—late 
filings are generally not accepted.
48
 Furthermore, the BIA does not 
follow the mailbox rule or accept electronic filings.
49
 Thus, a physical 
copy of the appeal must be sent via mail and received by the BIA in Falls 
Church, VA
50
 within thirty days; otherwise, the BIA will likely consider 
it to be late. 
Other than an appeal, a respondent has the right by statute to file one 
motion to reopen and one motion to reconsider (―MTR‖).51 Generally, a 
motion to reopen is based on new facts unknown at the time of the 
hearing.
52
 A motion to reconsider, on the other hand, is based on law.
53
 
In the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
of 1996 (―IIRIRA‖), Congress amended the INA to codify in statute the 
Board’s authority to entertain MTRs.54 The INA sets firm deadlines for 
MTRs: ninety days for a motion to reopen, and thirty days for a motion 
to reconsider.
55
 A MTR should be filed with the entity in which 
                                                                                                             
46 8 C.F.R. § 1240.15; see also 8 C.F.R. §1003.1(b) for a complete list of the types of 
decisions that the BIA may review on appeal. 
47 8 C.F.R § 1003.38(b); see also BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRACTICE MANUAL 
52 (2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/qapracmanual/BIAPracticeManual
.pdf (hereinafter PRACTICE MANUAL). 
48 8 C.F.R § 1003.38(b); see also PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 47. 
49 PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 47, at 14, 52, 126 (The only submission that the BIA 
will accept electronically is the EOIR-27 (Notice of Entry of Appearance as Attorney or 
Representative Before the Board of Immigration Appeals). 
50 Id. at 29. 
51 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(A), 1229a(c)(6)(B). ―MTR‖ as used in this paper is 
intended to reference both a motion to reopen and a motion to reconsider. ―MTR‖ as used 
in this paper is not intended to reference the following: (1) a motion to reopen and 
reconsider; (2) a joint motion to reopen; or (3) a joint motion to reconsider. 
52 8 U.S.C. §§1229a(c)(7)(B), 1003.2(c). 
53 8 U.S.C. §§1229a(c)(6), 1003.2(b)(1). 
54 Pub.L. No. 104-208, § 304(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-593 (Sept. 30, 1996). 
55 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(1),1003.2(c)(2), 1003.23(b)(1) (deadlines for motions to 
reopen before the BIA and the immigration court); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(6)(B), 
1003.2(b)(2), 1003.23(b)(1) (deadlines for motions to reconsider before the BIA and the 
immigration court). Note that there are also several specific exceptions to the thirty and 
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jurisdiction has vested.
56
 Jurisdiction usually remains with the judge until 
the appeal is filed with the BIA,
57
 however in rare cases the Board may 
also hear a case by certification.
58
 Thus, if jurisdiction still remains with 
the lower immigration court, then that court should be the one to hear the 
motion. On the other hand, if an appeal has already been filed, the 
motion should be filed with the BIA. 
If the MTR deadlines have passed, a respondent can request either a 
regulatory sua sponte MTR on the Board’s own authority59 or a 
regulatory joint MTR with opposing counsel.
60
 These motions have no 
time limits.
61
 
C. Bending the Rules: The Basics of Equitable Tolling 
Generally, to receive equitable tolling a party must establish: (1) that 
he has pursued his rights diligently; and (2) some extraordinary 
circumstance prevented timely filing.
62
 Courts have limited the doctrine’s 
application to exceptional cases to ensure adversarial and judicial 
fairness, and to discourage petitioners from sleeping on their rights.
63
 
                                                                                                             
ninety day deadlines codified in both statute and regulation; see also INA 
§ 240(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), 1003.23(b)(4)(i), 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), 
1003.23(b)(4)(i) (a motion to reopen to apply for asylum or withholding due to changed 
country conditions has no time limits where material evidence was unavailable and could 
not have been discovered at the previous proceeding); INA § 240(b)(5)(C) and 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.2(c)(3), § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii, iii) (in absentia orders); INA § 240(b)(5)(C) and 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.2(ac)(3), § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii), (iii)(A) (in absentia orders based on lack of 
notice, or noncitizen being in custody and failing to appear through no fault of his own); 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(B) (in absentia exclusion orders); INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(iv) 
(battered spouses, children, and parents). 
56 Generally, jurisdiction vests with the immigration judge by filing a Notice to 
Appear. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.14(a). Jurisdiction vests with the Board when an appeal is 
filed. See also PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 47, at 49. 
57 PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 47, at 49-50. 
58 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(c), 1003.3(d). 
59 8 C.F.R. §§1003.2(a), 1003.23(b)(1). 
60 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(3)(iii), 1003.23(b)(4)(iv). 
61 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(a), 1003.23(b)(1), 1003.2(c)(3)(iii),1003.23(b)(4)(iv). 
62 Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 632 (2010); see also Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 
U.S. 408 (2005). 
63 See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990); see also Neves v. 
Holder, 613 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 2010) (characterizing equitable tolling as a ―rare 
remedy‖ rather than a ―cure all.‖); see also Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 396 (―Traditionally . . . 
statutes of limitations are not controlling measures of equitable relief. Such statutes have 
been drawn upon by equity solely for the light they may shed in determining that which is 
decisive . . . namely, whether the plaintiff has inexcusably slept on his rights so as to 
make a decree against the defendant unfair.‖); see also Burnett v. New York Central R.R. 
Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (―Statutes of limitations are primarily designed to assure 
fairness to defendants‖). 
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1. A statute may be equitably tolled if it is not jurisdictional 
Equitable tolling is not applied to every deadline automatically; 
whether a deadline may be equitably tolled is a matter of congressional 
intent.
64
 The Supreme Court has held that only non-jurisdictional 
limitations statutes—that is, statutes that do not restrict a court’s subject-
matter or personal jurisdiction
65—may be equitably tolled.66 In 
Henderson v. Shinseki, the Court expressed its intention to ―bring some 
discipline‖ to the frequent misapplication of the term ―jurisdictional.‖67 
The Shinseki Court identified three factors to consider in determining 
whether a statute is jurisdictional: (1) the plain language of the statute; 
(2) the provision’s placement within the overall statute; and (3) the 
characteristics of the review scheme.
68
 
However, the Court in Shinseki reiterated that claim-processing rules 
are generally non-jurisdictional.
69
 Claim-processing rules, like the 
statutes at issue in this article, ―seek to promote the orderly progress of 
litigation by requiring parties to take certain procedural steps at specified 
times.‖70 Thus, there is no automatic bar against tolling claim-processing 
rules.
71
 Nevertheless, the ultimate question is Congressional intent, and 
Congress can attach jurisdictional attributes to statutes that would 
ordinarily look like claim-processing rules.
72
 
2. There is a general (but not universal) presumption that 
equitable tolling shall apply to a particular statute 
There is a general, rebuttable presumption that a particular statutory 
deadline may be equitably tolled.
73
 However, the Supreme Court has 
declined to apply that presumption to an agency’s internal filing 
deadlines.
74
 Nevertheless, the absence of a presumption is not 
                                                                                                             
64 Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 395 (―If Congress explicitly puts a limit upon the time for 
enforcing a right which it created, there is an end of the matter‖). 
65 Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011), 562 U.S. __ (2011).  
66 John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133-34 (2008). 
67 Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1202. 
68 Id. at 1204-06. 
69 Id. at 1203. 
70 Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1198. 
71 See John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. 130, 133-34 (2008). 
72 Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1203; see also Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. 
Ct. 817, 826-828 (2013) (holding that a statutory deadline was not jurisdictional but still 
not subject to equitable tolling). 
73 Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990). 
74 Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 827. 
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determinative—equitable tolling may still apply if Congress so intends 
equitable tolling to attach.
75
 
But without the presumption, there is no bright-line on how to 
evaluate Congressional intent. Though Congress may state its extent 
explicitly, thereby expressing its clear intent, the Supreme Court in 
Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center noted that it may consider 
context, and that Congress need not ―incant magic words‖ to invoke 
equitable tolling.
76
 Sotomayor’s concurrence advocates for consideration 
of exterior factors, such as the potential prejudice to the parties, in 
evaluating that context.
77
 While Sotomayor joins the majority’s holding 
in full, she also writes separately to note that in another case, perhaps 
where the party sophistication was lower, she may jump ship in the 
interest of social justice.
78
 
III. ANALYSIS 
Circuit courts have begun moving in the direction of a more 
generous application of immigration deadlines.
79
 But although the 
principles of stare decisis generally require the Board to follow circuit 
court precedent in the appellate jurisdiction where a case lies,
80
 the BIA 
has resisted some of the circuit courts’ efforts.81 Indeed, the BIA has 
been so unwilling to accept instruction on some issues that they have, on 
occasion, explicitly refused to follow circuit court precedent.
82
 The result 
is an ongoing conflict between the BIA and some circuits on whether and 
how a respondent may get his case reheard. 
There are hints that the BIA is incorporating some flexibility into its 
procedural mechanisms.
83
 However, the BIA has not yet laid down a 
framework for an equitable tolling claim based on an unrepresented 
                                                                                                             
75 Id. at 824. 
76 Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 824. 
77 Id. at 829 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
78 Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 829. 
79 See, e.g., Irigoyen-Briones v. Holder, 644 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2011); Neves v. 
Holder, 613 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2010); Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2011). 
80 See Matter of Anselmo, 20 I. & N. Dec. 25, 27 (BIA 1989) (interim decision 3105). 
81 See Matter of Liadov, 23 I. & N. Dec. 990 (BIA 2006); Matter of Armendarez, 24 I. 
& N. Dec. 646 (BIA 2008). 
82 See, e.g., Irigoyen, 644 F.3d 943. 
83 See, e.g., Matter of Kim, A035-127-124 (Oct. 12, 2011 and Jul. 30, 2012) 
(unpublished BIA decisions) (the BIA granted a special motion to toll a 212(c) deadline 
where the respondent filed it years late due his own gambling addiction and ineffective 
assistance of counsel); but see Matter of A-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 140 (BIA 1998) (refusing 
to toll the deadline for filing a motion to reopen an in absentia removal order based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel). 
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respondent’s mental illness. As shown below, the BIA generally remains 
rigid in the enforcement of its deadlines. 
A. Circuit Courts and the BIA are at Odds With Each Other 
on Whether the Thirty Day Deadline to File a Notice of 
Appeal May Be Equitably Tolled 
The jurisdictional status of the thirty-day appeal deadline is 
unsettled. The BIA does not accept that the thirty-day appeal deadline 
may be tolled at all.
84
 The circuits are split.
85
 Thus, a respondent in a 
circuit that permits equitable tolling of the appeal deadline is at an 
advantage over a respondent who is in a circuit that does not, although 
any relief will likely come from the circuit level rather than the BIA. 
The BIA extrapolated on its position in Matter of Liadov, a case in 
which the respondents missed the deadline because the post-office failed 
to deliver a guaranteed overnight delivery on time.
86
 The BIA ruled on 
this case, in favor of the government and the respondents appealed to the 
Eighth Circuit.
87
 However, after the BIA initially ruled and the 
respondents filed their appeal, the Ninth and Second Circuits both found 
that the BIA’s appeal deadline could be equitably tolled where a post-
office delivers the appeal late.
88
 In light of this, the parties in Liadov 
agreed to remand the case to the BIA for further consideration.
89
 But 
once again, the BIA refused to accept the appeal and reiterated that it 
would not accept late appeals.
90
 Although the BIA also recognized that it 
could certify a case to itself in extraordinary cases, the BIA found that 
such circumstances were not presented in the Liadov matter.
91
 According 
to the BIA, a party should ―anticipate the possibility that the guaranteed 
delivery might fail‖ rather than seeking assistance from the courts.92 The 
Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion 
to hold that the thirty-day deadline is mandatory and jurisdictional.
93
 
The BIA faced this issue again a few years later. In a Ninth Circuit 
case, the post-office again failed to deliver a notice of appeal on time, 
                                                                                                             
84 Matter of Liadov, 23 I. & N. Dec. 990, 993 (BIA 2006). 
85 Compare Liadov v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 1003 (8th Cir. 2008) with Irigoyen-Briones, 
644 F.3d 943. 
86 Matter of Liadov, 23 I. & N. Dec., at 990. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 990-91; Oh v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 611 (9th Cir. 2005); Zhong Guang Sun v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 421 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2005). 
89 Matter of Liadov, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 990. 
90 Id. at 993. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 992. 
93 Liadov, 518 F.3d at 1009-10. 
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and the BIA again called it late, ignoring the Ninth Circuit’s earlier 
ruling in Oh v. Gonzales.
94
 The Ninth Circuit overturned the BIA’s 
decision and ruled for the respondent.
95
 The court held that the 30-day 
appeal deadline was unambiguous and non-jurisdictional.
96
 The court 
also chastised the BIA for refusing to accept e-filings, which could 
resolve the post-office issue with little inconvenience to anyone.
97
 
As a result of this conflict between the BIA and the split circuits, 
respondents are at an unfair disadvantage; if in a circuit such as the 
Eighth Circuit, they have little hope for relief. If in the circuit such as the 
Ninth Circuit, they still have to appeal to the BIA, where they will 
presumably be denied relief. Respondents will then have to appeal again 
to the appellate court before relief will be granted. At best, the 
respondents’ relief will be unduly delayed or burdensome. 
B. Circuit Courts and the BIA are at Odds Over How to Treat 
Motions to Reopen, Especially with Regard to the Post-
Departure Bar 
The BIA has given little guidance on whether the statutory MTR 
deadlines are jurisdictional and whether equitable tolling may apply.
98
 
On the circuit level, however, nearly every court has ruled that motion 
deadlines are non-jurisdictional claim-processing rules that can be 
tolled.
99
 This is a positive step; but nevertheless, respondents may have 
trouble getting the BIA to rehear their case, particularly to the post-
departure bar. 
                                                                                                             
94 Irigoyen-Briones, 644 F.3d at 944-45. 
95 Id. at 951. 
96 Id. at 947. 
97 Id. at 951. 
98 One of the few times it has come up is in Matter of A-A-, where the BIA ruled that 
the deadline for reopening an in absentia removal order may be tolled for ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims. Matter of A-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 140 (BIA 1998); 8 U.S.C. 
§1154 (b)(5)(C)(i)(2014). 
99 The 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th circuits have affirmatively held 
that the MTR deadlines may be equitably tolled. Neves v. Holder, 613 F.3d 30, 33 (1st 
Cir. 2010); Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 130 (2d. Cir. 2000); Alzaarir v. Att’y Gen. of 
the U.S, 639 F.3d 86, 90 (3d. Cir. 2011), (citing Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 406 
(3d. Cir. 2005)); Kuusk v. Holder, 732 F.3d 302, 305 (4th Cir. 2013); Barry v. Mukasey, 
524 F.3d 721, 724 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Harchenko v. INS, 379 F.3d 405, 409-10 (6th 
Cir. 2004); Yuan Gao v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 376, 377 (7th Cir. 2008); Hernandez-Moran 
v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 496, 499-500 (8th Cir. 2005); Ghahremani v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 
993, 999 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003); 
Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2002); Avila-Santoyo v. Att’y Gen., 713 
F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2013); see also Ramos-Bonilla v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 216, 220 (5th 
Cir. 2008) (finding that a request to reopen based on equitable tolling is a request to 
reopen on the Board’s sua sponte authority). 
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In 1952, the Board’s power to entertain motions was limited by the 
post-departure bar.
100
 In 1961, Congress made the bar statutory.
101
 
However, Congress repealed the post-departure bar from the United 
States Code in the 1996 amendments to the INA.
102
 The post-departure 
bar, as written today, is a non-statutory federal regulation that says: 
A motion to reopen or [a motion] to reconsider shall not 
be made by or on behalf of a person who is the subject 
of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings 
subsequent to his or her departure from the United 
States. Any departure from the United States, including 
the deportation or removal of a person who is the subject 
of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings, 
occurring after the filing of a motion to reopen or a 
motion to reconsider, shall constitute a withdrawal of 
such motion.
103
 
The BIA generally considers the bar to be jurisdictional; thus, it will 
not hear a motion once a respondent has left the United States, whether 
forcibly removed or otherwise.
104
 The circuits, on the other hand, have 
generally found that the bar cannot apply to statutory MTRs.
105
 Seven 
circuits reached this conclusion by applying a Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council deference analysis,
106
 finding that when 
Congress chose not to include the post-departure bar in the 1996 
amendments that made 30/90 day MTRs statutory, Congress expressed 
                                                                                                             
100 17 Fed.Reg. 11,469, 11,475 (Dec. 19, 1952) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 6.2 (1953)). 
101 Act of Dept. 26, 1961, Pub.L. No. 87–301, § 5(a), 75 Stat. 650, 651–53 (1961). 
102 Pub.L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009. 
103 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(d), 1003.23(b)(1). 
104 Matter of Armendarez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 648; but see Matter of Bulnes, 25 I. & N. 
Dec. 57, 58-60 (BIA 2009) (holding that a judge may hear a motion to reopen an in 
absentia order post-departure where the respondent claims lack of notice). 
105 Santana v. Holder, 731 F.3d 50, 55-61 (1st Cir. 2013); Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85, 
100 (2d Cir. 2011); Prestol-Espinal v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 653 F.3d 213, 215-18 (3d 
Cir. 2011); William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 330-32 (4th Cir. 2007); Carias v. Holder, 
697 F.3d 257, 262-64 (5th Cir. 2012); Pruidze v. Holder, 632 F.3d 234, 238-39 (6th Cir. 
2011); Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 2010); Coyt v. Holder, 
593 F.3d 902, 905-07 (9th Cir. 2010); Contreras-Bocanegra v. Holder, 678 F.3d 811, 
814-18 (10th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Jian Le Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 681 F.3d 1236, 1239-
40 (11th Cir. 2012). 
106 Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984) (A court reviewing a federal agency’s interpretation of a statute must give effect 
to Congress’ unambiguously expressed intent. But if Congress is silent or its intent is 
ambiguous, the court should defer to the agency’s interpretation, so long as that 
interpretation is permissible). 
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its intent to make the post-departure bar illegal for those MTRs.
107
 Three 
circuits reached the same conclusion without relying on Chevron.
108
 
These courts concluded instead that the post-departure bar conflicts with 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Union Pac. R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive 
Eng’rs.109 According to these circuits, by promulgating the post-
departure bar the DOJ had impermissibly contracted the jurisdictional 
authority that Congress had delegated to it.
110
 
The Ninth Circuit has gone a step further. Like many of its sister 
circuits, the Ninth Circuit has found that the post-departure bar cannot 
apply to statutory MTRs.
111
 However it has also found that the post-
departure bar can only apply to a respondent who departs the United 
States while proceedings are taking place (emphasis added).
112
 Therefore 
once a respondent has been removed the post-departure no longer applies 
to him because he is no longer the subject of exclusion, deportation, or 
removal proceedings.
113
 Since the Ninth Circuit has outlawed the post-
departure bar with regard to statutory MTRs, this interpretation of the bar 
would only apply to sua sponte and joint MTRs. 
It is important to note that the circuit cases outlawing the post-
departure bar all arose in the context of statutory MTRs, rather than sua 
sponte or joint MTRs.
114
 The Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits have 
explicitly ruled that the bar still applies to sua sponte motions.
115
 No 
legal body has ruled on whether the bar applies to a joint motion. 
                                                                                                             
107 Santana, 731 F.3d at 55-61; Prestol-Espinal v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 653 F.3d 213, 
217 (3d Cir. 2011); William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 331-32 (4th Cir. 2007); Carias, 
697 F.3d at 263; Coyt, 593 F.3d at 905-07; Contreras-Bocanegra v. Holder, 678 F.3d 811, 
815-16 (10th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Jian Le Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 681 F.3d 1236, 1239-
40 (11th Cir. 2012). 
108 Luna, 637 F.3d at 100; Pruidze, 632 F.3d at 238-39; Marin-Rodriguez, 612 F.3d at 
594. 
109 Union Pac. R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 558 U.S. 67 (2009). 
110 Luna, 637 F.3d at 100; Pruidze, 632 F.3d at 238-39; Marin-Rodriguez, 612 F.3d at 
594. 
111 Coyt, 593 F.3d at 905-07. 
112 Lin v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the post-
departure bar only applies to respondents who are presently in proceedings because the 
drafters used the language ―is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal 
proceedings.‖) (emphasis added); see also Reynoso-Cisneros v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 1001, 
1002 (9th Cir. 2007). 
113 Lin, 473 F.3d at 982; see also Reynoso-Cisneros, 491 F.3d at 1002. 
114 Perez Santana, 731 F.3d at 51; Luna, 637 F.3d at 95; Prestol-Espinal, 653 F.3d at 
214; William, 499 F.3d at 330; Carias, 697 F.3d at 261; Pruidze v. Holder, 632 F.3d at 
236; Marin-Rodriguez, 612 F.3d at 592-93; Coyt, 593 F.3d at 906; Contreras-Bocanegra, 
678 F.3d at 813; Lin, 473 F.3d at 982-83; Jian Le Lin, 681 F.3d at 1238. 
115 Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 662 (2d Cir. 2010); Desai v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 
695 F.3d 267, 268 (3d Cir. 2012); Ovalles v. Holder, 577 F.3d 288, 296-97 (5th Cir. 
2009). 
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Despite the circuit court rulings, the BIA has tried to maintain its 
historical interpretation of the post-departure bar as a blanket ban on any 
MTR once a respondent has departed.
116
 In Matter of Armendarez, the 
BIA reiterated that it does not accept post-departure MTRs at all because 
it believes it does not have jurisdiction to hear the case of someone who 
is not in the United States
117
 Although Matter of Armendarez resulted 
from a case that originated in the Fifth Circuit, the BIA in Armendarez 
explicitly stated that it would continue to apply the ban as it always has, 
regardless of any contradictory circuit court precedent.
118
 
In sum, like with the appellate deadline, the BIA and the split circuits 
are at odds on how to treat a post-departure MTR, especially after the 
deadline has passed. And again, this leaves respondents at risk of undue 
prejudice in the immigration system. 
C. Foul Ball: The Fifth Circuit Impermissibly Conjoins 
Equitable Tolling with the Board’s Sua Sponte Power 
The Fifth Circuit is the prime example of the jurisdictional quandary 
that surrounds MTR deadlines. In Ramos-Bonilla v. Mukasey, the Fifth 
Circuit found that a request to file a late MTR based on equitable tolling 
is essentially a request that the Board reopen the case sua sponte.
119
 
Thus, the Fifth Circuit equates equitable tolling of MTR deadlines with 
the Board’s authority to reopen a case on its own. 
The Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Ramos-Bonilla has two major 
implications. First, the BIA now has total discretion to grant or deny all 
late filed MTRs in Fifth Circuit cases.
120
 Because the Board’s discretion 
to grant or deny a MTR sua sponte is unreviewable, that discretion now 
extends to late-filed statutory MTRs. 
Second, and less obviously, the post-departure bar likely now applies 
to both late-filed statutory MTRs and to sua sponte MTRs. Recall that in 
                                                                                                             
116 See Matter of Armendarez, 24 I. & N. Dec. 646, 648 (BIA 2008) (―We have 
reiterated that construction of the rule in an unbroken string of precedents extending over 
50 years, consistently holding that reopening is unavailable to any alien who departs the 
United States after being ordered removed.‖) (citing Matter of G-N-C-, 22 I&N Dec. 281, 
288 (BIA 1998); Matter of Okoh, 20 I&N Dec. 864, 864-65 (BIA 1994); Matter of 
Estrada, 17 I&N Dec. 187, 188 (BIA 1979), rev’d on other grounds, Estrada-Rosales v. 
INS, 645 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1981); Matter of Palma, 14 I&N Dec. 486, 487 (BIA 1973); 
accord Matter of Yih-HsiungWang, 17 I&N Dec. 565 (BIA 1980)). 
117 Matter of Armendarez, 24 I. & N. Dec., at 648; but see Matter of Bulnes, 25 I. & N. 
Dec. 57, 58-60 (BIA 2009). 
118 Matter of Armendarez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 653. 
119 Ramos-Bonilla v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 2007). 
120 Id.; see also Enriquez-Alvarado v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 246, 249-50 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that the Fifth Circuit does not have the jurisdiction to review the Board’s grant 
or denial of a sua sponte motion). 
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the Fifth Circuit the post-departure bar still applies to a sua sponte 
MTR.
121
 So if equitable tolling of a statutory motion is the same as a sua 
sponte motion, the post-departure bar now applies to an equitably tolled 
statutory motion.
122
 It does not, however, apply to statutory MTRs filed 
on time.
123
 
Ramos-Bonilla is very prejudicial to all Fifth Circuit respondents, but 
the decision is especially troublesome for post-departure respondents due 
to the new applicability of the post-departure bar to late-filed statutory 
motions. This means that, in the Fifth Circuit, a post-departure 
respondent’s only chance of relief past the MTR deadlines is now a joint 
motion with opposing counsel. Of course, there is no guarantee that DHS 
will even consider joining such a motion. The illogical result is that a 
respondent who somehow manages to stay in the United States despite 
an adverse ruling may have his case reheard years past the deadline, 
while a respondent who was forcibly removed directly after the ruling 
may have no form of relief as soon as the deadline has passed, even if he 
otherwise qualifies for equitable tolling. 
The Fifth Circuit’s holding in Ramos-Bonilla is unique; no other 
circuit so equates equitable tolling of the MTR deadlines with a sua 
sponte motion. This is not a surprise, given that the opinion’s foundation 
in logic and law lacks a sound foundation. Indeed the court provides 
virtually no analysis in its decision at all. The only explanation that the 
Ramos-Bonilla court gives for its decision is this: 
This court has held that a request for equitable tolling of 
a time- or number-barred motion to reopen on the basis 
of ineffective assistance of counsel is ―in essence an 
argument that the BIA should have exercised its 
discretion to reopen the proceeding sua sponte based 
upon the doctrine of equitable tolling.‖ (emphasis 
added)
124
 
The single source that the Fifth Circuit uses to support its claim that 
it has held this way before is an unpublished case, Jie Lin v. Mukasey.
125
 
The Jie Lin court, partially cited in Ramos-Bonilla, says only this: 
―[b]ecause equitable tolling is not a basis for filing an untimely or 
                                                                                                             
121 Ovalles, 577 F.3d at 296-97. 
122 Compare Ramos-Bonilla 543 F.3d at 220 with Ovalles, 577 F.3d at 296-97. 
123 Compare Ramos-Bonilla 543 F.3d at 220 with Carias v. Holder, 697 F.3d 257, 262-
64 (5th Cir. 2012) 
124 Ramos-Bonilla 543 F.3d at 220 (citing Jie Lin v. Mukasey, 286 Fed.Appx. 148, 150 
(5th Cir. 2008)). 
125 Ramos-Bonilla 543 F.3d at 220. 
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numerically-barred motion under the statute or regulations, this argument 
is in essence an argument that the BIA should have exercised its 
discretion to reopen the proceeding sua sponte based upon the doctrine of 
equitable tolling.‖126 No citation follows this quote.127 Thus, Jie Lin 
simply assumes that equitable tolling cannot be a basis for filing an 
untimely motion, and therefore a request for a late-filed motion must be a 
sua sponte motion.
128
 Yet we know that in nearly every other circuit, 
equitable tolling can be a basis for filing such a motion.
129
 But since Jie 
Lin provides no explanation for its assumption and Jie Lin is the only 
basis for Ramos-Bonilla, we can only speculate as to how the Fifth 
Circuit reached its conclusion. 
Given the confusion, the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari 
in Mata v. Holder, an unreported Fifth Circuit case reaffirming Ramos-
Bonilla.
130
 Oral argument was heard in April of 2015.
131
 The Supreme 
Court opinion in the coming months will hopefully shed some much-
needed light onto this very murky scenario. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Proposed Recommendations for the BIA and Circuit Courts 
The following are proposed recommendations that the BIA and 
Circuit Courts may implement for a more streamlined and fair process.  
                                                                                                             
126 Jie Lin v. Mukasey, 286 Fed.Appx. at 150. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Neves v. Holder, 613 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2010); Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 130 
(2d. Cir. 2000); Alzaarir v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S, 639 F.3d 86, 90 (3d. Cir. 2011) (citing 
Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 406 (3d. Cir. 2005)); Kuusk v. Holder, 732 F.3d 302, 
305 (4th Cir. 2013); Barry v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 721, 724 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing 
Harchenko v. INS, 379 F.3d 405, 409-10 (6th Cir. 2004); Yuan Gao v. Mukasey, 519 
F.3d 376, 377 (7th Cir. 2008); Hernandez-Moran v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 496, 499-500 
(8th Cir. 2005); Ghahremani v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing 
Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003); Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253, 1258 
(10th Cir. 2002); Avila-Santoyo v. Att’y Gen., 713 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2013) 
130 Mata v. Holder, No. 13-60253 (5th Cir. May 16, 2014). 
131 Mata v. Holder, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/mata-
v-holder/. 
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1. The BIA should make it clear that case review 
deadlines, including appeal deadlines and MTR 
deadlines, may be equitably tolled and adopt a clear and 
precise test for applying such tolling to mental 
incompetency 
The BIA should make it clear that both appellate deadlines and MTR 
deadlines are non-jurisdictional and may be equitably tolled. As laid out 
above, the circuits are already moving in that direction. The BIA should 
join the circuits in this movement in the interest of ensuring that all 
respondents have adequate procedural mechanisms at their disposal to 
ensure a full and fair proceeding. 
It is important that both appellate deadlines and MTR deadlines be 
equitably tolled. Although most respondents seeking late relief likely will 
not need to toll the appellate deadline if they have access to an MTR, a 
respondent is only granted one motion to reopen and one motion to 
reconsider.
132
 If a respondent has used his motion previously, he may not 
have the option to utilize that mechanism at all, leaving an appeal as his 
only opportunity for relief. Thus, both the appeal deadlines and the MTR 
deadlines should be found to be non-jurisdictional and subject to 
equitable tolling. 
The BIA should also adopt a test, such as the test for incompetency 
in Matter of M-A-M-, for how to apply equitable tolling to incompetency 
in the immigration context. Courts have found in other contexts that 
mental illness or incapacity can constitute an exceptional circumstance 
justifying equitable tolling.
133
 This test must be clear and precise, and 
must be flexible enough that it does not preclude immigration 
respondents from meeting the test. The BIA should move in this 
direction, as well, in order to best protect respondents with mental 
disorders in immigration removal proceedings. 
2. The BIA and the Circuits should remove the post-
departure bar or, alternatively, adopt a less-restrictive 
interpretation of the bar 
Again, the post-departure bar as currently interpreted by the BIA 
prohibits any respondent from filing an MTR after leaving the United 
                                                                                                             
132 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(A), 1229a(c)(6)(B) 
133 See e.g. Barrett v. Principi, 363 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 
1092 (9th Cir. 2010); Bolarwina v. Williams, 593 F.3d 226 (2d. Cir. 2010). 
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States.
134
 This means that a respondent who was unable to file pre-
departure is prohibited from filing an MTR at all. A respondent with a 
mental disorder may not be able to meet this obligation. Therefore, all 
circuits and the BIA should come to the conclusion that most circuits 
have already reached and outlaw the post-departure bar. 
If the courts are unwilling to remove the post-departure bar entirely, 
then they should find, as most circuit courts have, that the post-departure 
bar does not apply to statutory MTRs
135—this will provide at least one 
mechanism of relief for unlawfully deported individuals with a mental 
disorder.
136
 But remember, an individual only has the statutory right to 
file one motion to reopen and one motion to reconsider.
137
 If you have 
utilized that right, then your only other alternative is a regulatory sua 
sponte motion or joint motions.
138
 Thus, courts should ban the post-
departure bar in its entirety instead of leaving it applicable to sua sponte 
motions and potentially applicable to joint motions—this ensures that an 
individual who has already used his one statutory motion to reopen or his 
one statutory motion to reconsider is not precluded from bringing a post-
departure motion. 
If courts must leave the post-departure bar applicable to any motion, 
they should also accept the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation that the post-
departure bar only applies to respondents who leave the country while 
proceedings are taking place.
139
 This interpretation at least permits 
respondents whose proceedings have come to a conclusion to still file an 
MTR because if their proceedings have been closed; the bar does not 
                                                                                                             
134 Matter of Armendarez, 24 I. & N. Dec. 646, 648; but see Matter of Bulnes, 25 I. & 
N. Dec. 57, 58-60 (BIA 2009) (holding that a judge may hear a motion to reopen an in 
absentia order post-departure where the respondent claims lack of notice). 
135 Santana v. Holder, 731 F.3d 50, 55-61 (1st Cir. 2013); Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85, 
100 (2d Cir. 2011); Prestol-Espinal v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 653 F.3d 213, 215-18 (3d 
Cir. 2011); William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 330-32 (4th Cir. 2007); Carias v. Holder, 
697 F.3d 257, 262-64 (5th Cir. 2012); Pruidze v. Holder, 632 F.3d 234, 238-39 (6th Cir. 
2011); Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 2010); Coyt v. Holder, 
593 F.3d 902, 905-07 (9th Cir. 2010); Contreras-Bocanegra v. Holder, 678 F.3d 811, 
814-18 (10th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Jian Le Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 681 F.3d 1236, 1239-
40 (11th Cir. 2012). 
136 But remember, an individual only has the right in statute to file one motion to reopen 
and one motion to reconsider. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(A), 1229a(c)(6)(B). If you have 
utilized that right, then your only other alternative is a sua sponte motion or joint 
motions. 8 C.F.R. §§1003.2(a), 1003.23(b)(1). To ensure that using your one statutory 
motion doesn’t preclude you from bringing a claim post-departure, courts should just ban 
the post-departure bar in its entirety instead of leaving it applicable to sua sponte motions 
and potentially applicable to joint motions. 
8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(3)(iii), 1003.23(b)(4)(iv). 
137 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(A), 1229a(c)(6)(B). 
138 8 C.F.R. §§1003.2(a), 1003.23(b)(1). 
139 Lin v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 2007). 
248 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:227 
 
apply to them since they are no longer ―the subject of . . . 
proceedings.‖140 Unfortunately, this interpretation means that a 
respondent with a mental illness who did leave the United States before 
the judge issued his final ruling may still find the bar applicable to his 
case.
141
 Hence, removing the bar entirely is preferable. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The BIA has emphasized its devotion to its historical practices in its 
unwillingness to accept new policies and procedures.
142
 Its traditional 
dependence on bright-line rules and deadlines may promote 
administrative efficiency. But fairness requires flexibility, and whatever 
the BIA may seek to achieve through stringent application of deadlines is 
outweighed by the dangers to respondents, especially those with limited 
competency. Although historical interpretations should not be rejected at 
will, the law often must change to meet the growing standards of fairness 
in contemporary times. This article humbly beseeches the BIA and the 
judicial circuits to incorporate that fairness and flexibility in its 
interpretation of deadlines and to create clear and uniform mechanisms 
for granting post-decision equitable relief to respondents who suffer from 
a mental illness or disability. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
140 Lin, 473 F.3d at 982.; 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(d), 1003.23(b)(1). 
141 Lin, 473 F.3d at 982.; 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(d), 1003.23(b)(1). 
142 See, e.g., Matter of Armendarez, 24 I. & N. Dec. 646, 647-48 (BIA 2008). 
